United States Fuel Company and ANR Co.; Intermountain Power Agency  v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company : Supplemental Submission by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
United States Fuel Company and ANR Co.;
Intermountain Power Agency v. Huntington-
Cleveland Irrigation Company : Supplemental
Submission
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Denise A. Dragoo; Bradley R. Cahoon; Snell and Wilmer; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees United
States Fuel Company and ANR Co., Inc.; Ronald L. Rencher; Mark W. Dykes; Leboeuf, Lamb,
Greene and MacRae; Attorneys for Intermountain Power Agency.
J. Craig Smith; David B. Hartvigsen; Scott M. Ellsworth; Nielsen and Senior; Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellant, Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company.
This Supplemental Submission is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Supplemental Submission, United States Fuel Company and ANR Co.; Intermountain Power Agency v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation
Company, No. 20010815.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1940
FILED 
Snell &Wilmer UTAH SUPREME C0URT 
• L.L.E 
LAW OFFICES APR 1 6 2003 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 CLERK OF THE UUUHI TUCSON, ARIZONA 
(801)2574900 
Fax: (801) 2574800 IRVINE, CALIFORNIA 
www.swlaw.com 
DENVER, COLORADO 
Denise A. Dragoo (801) 2574998
 I^ s VB0ASt NEVADA 
dckagoo@swlaw.com 
April 16,2003 
Hand Delivered 
Pat Bartholomew 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210 
Re: United States Fuel Company and ANR Co., Inc., Intermountain Power Agency v. 
Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Company, 
Supreme Court No. 2©OT68i7=SC 
Jzoo(o8i5 
Dear Mr. Bartholomew: 
On behalf of appellees United States Fuel Company and ANR Co., Inc., I am writing to 
inform the Court of a pertinent court decision pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Provo River Water Users Ass 'n v. Lambert, 642 
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LEXSEE 642 P.2D 1219 
PROVO RIVER WATER USERS ASSOCIATION, a corporation, et al., Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, v. Hubert C. LAMBERT, as State Engineer of the State of Utah; 
Provo City Corporation, et al., Defendants and Appellants; Lawson O. Hamblin and 
Ida Hamblin, his wife, Intervenors and Appellants 
No. 16724 
Supreme Court of Utah 
642 P.2d 1219; 1982 Utah LEXIS 889 
February 10,1982, Filed 
COUNSEL: 
Jackson Howard, Provo, Utah. 
E. J. Skeen, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff. 
Joseph Novak, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Dallin W. Jensen, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Thomas E. Clyde, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Thomas W. Forsgren, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Ray L. Montgomery, Salt Lake City, Utah for 
Defendant. 
JUDGES: 
Henriod, Retired Justice, wrote the opinion. I 
concur: Gordon J. Hall, Chief Justice. Crockett, Retired 
Justice concurring with comments. Richard C. Howe, 
Justice concurring in the result. Crockett, Retired 
Justice, concurs in the opinion of Justice Howe. I. Daniel 
Stewart, Justice dissenting. Maughan, Justice, did not 
participate herein; Henriod, Retired Justice, sat. 
Crockett, Retired Justice, acted on this case prior to his 
retirement. 
OPINIONBY: 
HENRIOD 
OPINION: 
[*1219] This is a case involving the ownership of 
the right to use 2.52 cubic feet per second of the waters 
of Provo River, a tributary of Utah Lake in central Utah. 
It has a protracted and somewhat litigious history in more 
than one sense and some of the facts about which it is 
concerned predate the statutory interdiction that turned 
the method of appropriation from a diligence use [**2] 
only to one conditioned on filing an application with the 
Utah State Engineer as provided by statute, nl followed 
by opinions such as Wellsville v. Lindsay n2 to the effect 
that the state was the sole purveyor of practically all of 
the waters of the state. 
nl Ch. 100, Laws of Utah 1903. 
n2 104 Utah 448, 137 P.2d 634 (1943). 
[*1220] The water claimed in this case initially was 
appropriated before the statute mentioned and was the 
subject of adjudication long, long ago in the "Chidester" 
decree. n3 
n3 Provo River v. Telluride, Civil No. 957, 
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah 
County, State of Utah, January 26, 1907. 
The water rights involved here, along with that of 
other claimants were laid to rest on May 21, 1921, in the 
"Provo River" or "Morse Decree." n4 It is sort of a Bible 
controlling the waters of a [**3J good portion of the 
Provo River, that meander to another sort of scriptural 
Dead Sea, via Utah Lake, and another similar landmark, 
the Jordan River to the Great Salt Lake. Some of the 
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Chapters of the Decree are the Genesis of this litigation. 
Pertinent language is written in Paragraphs 28 and 124, 
reproduced and italicized for emphasis as follows: 
28 
JOHN D. DIXON. From January 1st to December 
31st 
As successor in interest to J. H. Snyder, Joshua J. 
Mecham, John W. Hoover, and Hyrum Heiselt to 2.80 
second feet of water which was appropriated upon lands 
in Provo Canyon, the place of use and the point of 
diversion having been changed and the said water is now 
being used upon lands below the mouth of Provo 
Canyon, and the point of diversion from Provo River is 
now at and near the mouth of Provo Canyon, Utah 
County, Utah, and said use may be continued and the 
quantity to which the said defendant is entitled at his said 
point of diversion, at and near the mouth of Provo 
Canyon, is 2.52 second feet; the same being of the 
transferred water rights referred to in subdivision (a) 
paragraph 33, hereof. 
124 
That all rights declared and decreed herein, [**4] 
for domestic and municipal uses and for the generation 
of power, are continuous throughout the year without 
limitation to time or season. 
And that all the rights declared and decreed herein, 
for irrigation purposes, include the right to divert and 
use water for irrigation, culinary, domestic and 
agricultural purposes connected therewith. And such 
rights of diversion and use for culinary, and domestic 
purposes are continuous throughout the year, and are 
limited to the quantity reasonably necessary for said 
uses. And such rights of diversion and use for irrigation 
purposes is confined to the irrigation season of each 
year, and none of said parties shall divert or use any of 
said waters, (except for culinary and domestic purposes 
as hereinbefore provided), during the non-irrigating 
season—after the necessity for such use for irrigation 
purposes has ceased in the Autumn of each year and 
until it is necessary to use the same for irrigation 
purposes in the Spring of the year following. 
n4 Provo Reservoir Co. v. Provo City, Civil 
No. 2888, Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
May 21, 1921. 
1**51 
The language reflects a right to a year-round, 
January 1st to December 31st, use by John D. Dixon, in 
fact and presumptively, for present and future use of 2.52 
cubic feet per second of Provo River water for culinary 
and domestic purposes during the irrigation md non-
irrigation seasons, specifically defining the irrigation 
season as only from spring to autumn, which therefore 
defines non-irrigation as the remaining or winter months. 
Since some of the Points on Appeal are mooted by 
our decision, the following observations and conclusions 
may be catalogued to expedite, and avoid confusion: 
1. Provo City, having acquired the rights of any 
conflicting claims of others, for the purposes of this case, 
has whatever rights in the subject water, that were 
awarded to John D. Dixon in the Morse Decree. 
2. We differ from the trial court's "finding" that 
Provo City had the burden of proving its own right to the 
water, concluding that such burden is on the plaintiffs 
[*1221] attacking it, - the Provo River Water Users 
Association, et al, who alleged that defendants had never 
exercised such rights. Plaintiffs, assertion that because 
the interveners, Hamblin, had questioned [**6] Provo 
City's right and Provo City resisted the claim, and 
reasserted its own, that somehow this circumstance would 
shift the burden of proof. Since Provo need not have had 
to prove its claim against plaintiffs, we cannot see how 
plaintiffs could avoid their primary obligation to take 
over the laboring oar. 
3. Our conclusion above is not the primary ratio 
decidendi here, and therefore, a remand for a new trial is 
not necessary or ordered for that reason. 
Addressing ourselves to the "burden of proof issue 
that seriously was debated below, we refer to some of our 
own pronouncements to the effect that generally he who 
asserts something has the burden to prove it. 
In Tanner v. Humphrey, n5 a forerunner of this case, 
we said that: 
In an application for a change of diversion, it is not 
necessary for a party so applying each time to make a 
showing that it has beneficially used its water right. If it 
has not, then the protestants may so show.... 
.... It may be that the plaintiff should put in general proof 
that the change will not injure or disturb vested rights, 
but if so, it is rather in homage to the general rule that he 
is required to offer proof in support of [**7J all his 
allegations, and .... the burden rests upon the plaintiff to 
establish the necessary facts to make out a prima facie 
case .... We must assume that the rights which the decree 
642 P.2d 1219, *; 1982 Utah LEXIS 889, ** 
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No. 2888 Civil gave to Dixon still belong to the plaintiff. 
Later, we said as much in Wellsville v. Lindsay: n6 
The burden is on the person asserting abandonment 
to prove it. Here there is no evidence to show an intent 
to abandon. In fact, the evidence almost conclusively 
shows just the contrary. We must conclude that the 
plaintiffs did not abandon their rights to this water and 
this defense must fall. 
That case had to do with an abandonment, which is 
not pleaded in the instant case, - the plaintiffs here simply 
alleging that there was no right in esse at any time that 
could be abandoned, but we opine that the same rule as 
to burden of proof and the policy of reason behind it are 
equally apropos here. 
Irrespective of the above, or any other rule as to the 
burden of proof, the plaintiffs offered none, but Provo 
City did present cogent evidence attesting to its right to 
use the water by putting in evidence the Morse Decree, 
and the deposition of an experienced [**8] water man 
and an eyewitness before, at, and after the Morse Decree 
was penned and entered on May 21, 1921. 
4. The issues here, stated in plaintiffs' brief, are: 
a) Whether Provo City is entitled to divert any water 
during the non-irrigation season under the Dixon Right; 
and 
b) Whether there is any substantial evidence to 
support the basic findings of the trial court that no water 
was required for domestic and culinary purposes on the 
Dixon premises during the non-irrigation season under 
the Dixon Right at the time of entry of the (Morse) 
Decree [with which we have no particular quarrel]. 
We conclude as to 4a), supra, that Provo City is 
entitled to divert the 2.52 cubic feet per second of the 
water as owner of the right to use it under the terms of 
the Morse Decree, and as to 4b), there is nothing 
substantial or whatever in the record to support the trial 
court's finding that there was no water used as stated 
therein. 
In saying so, we are mindful of the myriad of 
decisions affirming the lower courts if there is substantial 
evidence to affirm. We simply conclude that the Morse 
Decree awarded John D. Dixon the right involved, that 
there [**9] has been no appeal therefrom [*1222] and 
that the Decree has been honored and respected by 
everyone from its inception, May 21, 1921, until 
questioned by letter authored by the plaintiff, Provo 
River Water Users Assn., on March 8,1967, addressed to 
the State Engineer in the form of a demand to discontinue 
distribution of the subject water thereafter, - an event 
occurring 46 years after the Decree. 
5. The only order or decree involving the use of 
water in this case that can be said to be "res judicata" is 
the Morse Decree itself. 
The statute, having to do with the Engineer's 
authority, n7 leaves dispositive orders or judgments to 
the courts, and all of the orders or judgments involved in 
this case have conceded that John D. Dixon, Esthma 
Tanner, his successor, and Provo City, her successor, 
have had and do have a right to use 2.52 cubic feet per 
second of water for culinary or domestic purposes, or its 
statutory equivalent by exchange, n8 and the only matter 
of concern is whether John D. Dixon used or was entitled 
to use the amount of water on or about (or as plaintiffs 
say, on that day) May 21, 1921. 
6. That all other issues raised as to whether plaintiffs' 
two causes [**10] of action, - one under the declaratory 
judgment legislation n9 and one for review of the State 
Engineer's orders, nlO the finality of the Morse Decree, 
alleged error in not recognizing previous decrees, etc., 
need not be discussed in light of our opinion here, since 
they are moot. 
n5 87 Utah 164, 48 P.2d 484 (1935). 
n6 Supra, note 2. 
n7 73-2-1 et seq., U.C.A. 1953. 
n8 Ch. 67, Sec. 8. L.Ut. 1919; Sec. 100-3-3, 
Rev.St.Ut. 1933, 1943; Sec. 73-3-3, U.C.A. 1953. 
n9 Sec. 78-33-2, U.C.A. 1953. 
nlO Sees. 73-3-14 and 15, U.C.A. 1953. 
In support of our conclusion, we set out briefly the 
chronology and reasons therefor extending over a half 
century time frame following the Morse Decree: 
In 1924, Dixon transferred his right to one Caleb 
Tanner, followed by Esthma Tanner's acquisition thereof, 
she representing a key figure in this water saga. In 1931, 
she filed an application with the State Engineer, No. a-
1171, to change the use of the water from culinary and 
domestic use, with Provo City, [**11] for its domestic 
and municipal use, and also to change the point of 
diversion of the water. The State Engineer rejected the 
application, followed by her appeal to the Fourth District 
Court, n i l which affirmed the State Engineer. She 
appealed that decision in 1934 to this Court, which in 
1935, in a purely directory decision, reversed the 
decision below without determining any rights, n!2 but 
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remanding the matter for a plenary trial, which was 
accomplished, ending in findings of fact among which 
was one confirming Esthma's ownership of the right 
before the application "and at all times since." The 
judgment in that case also was directory only, and it 
simply reinstated Esthma's Application No. a-1171 to its 
original 1931 date, "subject to existing rights of the 
parties and without prejudice to challenge the rights of 
the parties thereafter in Provo River water." 
nil Tanner v. Humphreys, Civil No. 8481. 
nl2 Tanner v. Humphreys, 87 Utah 164, 48 
P.2d 484 (1935). 
Some nine years later, [**12] after Provo City had 
used the full volume of the decreed water and after 
having purchased Esthma's right in 1940, the City filed 
an Application No. a-2502, on November 16, 1950, for a 
change in point of diversion, - not in use, and continued 
to use the water until the application was approved by the 
State Engineer in Order No. a-460 on February 9, 1966, 
authorizing the taking of the water from a different site 
for the more convenient use of the full 2.52 cubic feet per 
second of the water already having been used beneficially 
and continuously since about the time of Esthma's first 
Application No. a-1171 in 1931. 
The Utah Power and Light Co. had been the sole 
"protestant" at the hearing, but it did not appeal the 
original, Feb. 19, 1966, a-460 order. None of the 
plaintiffs, except Utah Power and Light, protested 
Application [*1223] No. a-2502, or the a-460 order 
issued therein, nor did any of them attempt to intervene 
in any of the litigation involving the subject water, albeit 
almost all could have done so, nl3 nor have any of them 
ever filed for appropriation of the water which under 
their contentions would have been escape water that 
would have been appropriable. [**13] 
nl3 Plaintiff Provo River Water Users was 
incorporated in 1935. 
In spite of the above long history of inaction or non-
assertion of rights, on March 8, 1967, over a year after 
the a-460 order, and about 10 months after the statutory 
time to review it had expired, the plaintiff, Provo River 
Water Users Association, wrote a letter to the State 
Engineer requesting that no more of the 2.52 c.f.s. of 
water be distributed to Provo City. The letter appeared 
to be short on specifics, but not so short on implication 
that if Provo were unable to put the water to use it would 
run downstream as waste water until it mingled with Utah 
Lake, whose waters were the principal source of supply 
under the claims of the plaintiffs. Nonetheless, the 
Engineer apparently, without being required to, but out of 
a spirit of fair play, held a hearing and cut the former 
flow to Provo in half, resulting in the other half, which no 
one had filed to appropriate, running as waste water into 
the lake. nl4 
nl4 With consequent evaporation loss, 
pointed out in American Fork Irr. Co. v. Linke, 
121 Utah 90, 239 P.2d 188 (1951), reflecting 
rather startling results. 
[**14] 
Strangely enough, both sides questioned the 
Engineer's authority to amend the previous order. At any 
rate, the Water Users "appealed" from the "amendment" 
which posed the issue as to their standing in court to do 
so, but which we do not consider in this decision. 
Since everyone concedes that Dixon had a right to 
use the water under the Morse Decree, it is presumed to 
persist until someone successfully defeats it for some 
better reason than that urged by the plaintiffs that there is 
no evidence that Dixon ever exercised his right by using 
the water during the non-irrigation season, - discussed 
hereinafter. Suffice to say that such conclusion is adjunct 
to a negative, - absence of fact, - and a non-sequitur 
winking at the presumption of ownership born of the 
Decree, ignoring the sworn testimony of an eyewitness, 
and looking through blinders at the almost half-century 
recognition of the uninterrupted right started by the 
Decree, the State Engineer's approval, the trial court's 
acknowledgment of it, this Court's blessing of it, and 
even the plaintiffs' silent tribute to it by virtue of their 
failure to question such right, or assert any claimed 
interest therein, or pursue any effort [**15J to 
appropriate the water for lack of use by Dixon, et al., 
other than to write a letter of objection after that almost 
half-century interim since the Decree. 
The presumption of ownership of the water right 
must be destroyed by facts or for some other legal reason, 
neither of which is present in this case, so far as plaintiffs 
are concerned, since they rested without proffering any 
facts save silence. On the other hand, the defendant, 
without any legal obligation so to do, did offer facts that 
were unrebutted, - first, the Morse Decree because it is in 
every sense "res judicata," and secondly, the eyewitness 
testimony of Newell, uncontradicted and unimpeached. 
642 P.2d 1219, *; 1982 Utah LEXIS 889, ** 
Fageo 
As to the trial court's finding, which we consider and 
hold to have been unsupported in the record, either 
documentary or deposition-wise, that: "This action is the 
first time any court of competent jurisdiction has been 
called upon to determine and fix the quantity of water as 
was reasonably required for domestic and culinary 
purposes during the non-irrigation season where the 
water was used under the John D. Dixon Water Right at 
the time of the Decree," - we believe to be an ipse dixit, 
at variance with, not supported [**16] by either law or 
fact, and not in harmony with one of the most respected 
presumptions in our law, - that of continued ownership 
and use of one's once-established right thereto, until 
clearly upset [*1224] by facts presented by an adversary 
that destroy it. The presumption in this case has been 
blessed here by the uninterrupted running of a 
grandfather's clock, so to speak. The Water Users may 
have attempted to interrupt it when it wrote a letter to the 
Engineer, which letter had no probative significance that 
stopped it. Rather, it was untimely at best, and struck no 
chord loud enough to affect the passage of time that gave 
status to the right to use water born of the Morse Decree. 
The record here suggests the wholesome doctrine we 
espoused in the Tanner case, when we suggested that: 
In an application for change of diversion, it is not 
necessary for a party so applying each time to make a 
showing that it has beneficially used its water right. 
Even if the above were not so, the plaintiffs lost their 
right to suggest or contest what the owner of the right to 
use water had done by way of user, what he was required 
to show before any tribunal having jurisdiction, [**17] 
including State Engineer and courts, or how he should 
employ it presently, by their failure to register a protest at 
the time and place required by controlling legislation, - as 
is the case here. 
The defendant, Provo City, called as a witness a 
former employee and Superintendent in the Water 
Department for 36 years, starting in 1926, five years after 
the Morse Decree, who said that about 1930-32, he was 
familiar with the Morse Decree and Dixon's culinary 
right in the amount of 2.52 c.f.s., which Provo City 
commenced using on an exchange, contractual basis nl5 
with the Tanners; that it was used in the non-irrigation 
season, among other things, for stock watering purposes; 
that the first he heard of the Dixon Right was during the 
trial of the case; that there could have been more than 
three or four homes on the Dixon land, but not more than 
ten; that at that time there were "probably a hundred or a 
hundred fifty head of livestock on the property," or "quite 
a herd of cattle in there"; that the water used for livestock 
came in a ditch, and was used for domestic purposes in 
the homes; that Provo City acquired the water right from 
Tanner, which was called the "Dixon right." 
nl5 Change Application a-1171 was filed in 
1931. 
[**18] 
Plaintiffs' contention that John D. Dixon had to be 
using the amount of water at the time of the Decree 
seems to destroy the contention itself, since the Decree 
was entered on May 21, 1921, which was about one-third 
into the irrigation season, and not in the non-irrigation 
season, which is the season about which plaintiffs are 
concerned. 
The plaintiffs, to be consistent, would have to 
contend that use at the time of the Decree contemplates a 
"reasonable" use that may be "on or about" to time of the 
Decree, even as long as four months later, and into the 
non-irrigation season. This position, more or less, would 
be consistent with what this Court is contending, that no 
proof of failure to use on the date of the decree, does not 
destroy the right to use. If the Morse Decree were not 
intended to give John D. Dixon a right to use the water 
four months after its date, for culinary use in the non-
irrigation season, - for example, in November or 
December, the Decree must have been a still birth or at 
least an abortion of the concept of reasonable use. 
We cannot believe that non-use of water on the date 
of the decree could deny Dixon a right of future use if 
[**19] his house and barn had burned down on that date 
and he and his cows were the victims of a careless match 
or the Grim Reaper in the process, - which emphasizes 
that the right to use is primary and depends on need and 
circumstance. Such right need not be daily, as is 
recognized in the bifurcated Morse Decree, and the right 
would not be lost, albeit employed daily, - but "never on 
Sunday." It is the right to use that controls over any 
absolute of continuity, - and each case must be viewed as 
the law contemplates it should, bottomed on a rule of 
reason. We believe such rule does not embrace a 
situation where there is no "proof of use on the day of 
the Decree, as claimed here, but where the right has been 
recognized and [*1225] used for 46 years, buttressed by 
an unrebutted presumption, and reinforced not only by 
lack of objection, but by hard unimpeached evidence, at 
the time an unsupported claim is "alleged," denying such 
use for the untenable reason that the objector has no 
burden to prove such non-user. 
As to any suggestion that Provo City's rights were 
adjudicated in Tanner v. Humphreys in 1935, or that 
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anyone else's right was adjudicated for that matter, it 
appears [**20] to be without merit, since there was no 
adjudication of any rights in that case. 
There was talk as to what evidence might prove, if 
proffered, as to rights that possibly could be asserted or 
damaged and to what extent, if the Application for 
Change in Point of Diversion were granted, based in part 
on whether water was diverted from tributaries or the 
mainstream, and considering possible damage or 
interference with vested rights of others. The 
Application, No. a-1171, subject of the Tanner case, was 
not a proceeding to adjudicate rights, nor could it have 
been, since the State Engineer has no power of such 
adjudication. 
That there was no adjudication of any water rights is 
apparent upon examination of the judgment in that case, 
which reads as follows: 
From the above it must be concluded that the court 
erred in granting the motion for non-suit. The judgment 
of non-suit and dismissal is reversed, with instructions to 
reinstate the complaint and to proceed with the trial If, 
upon the evidence .... it appears that a vested right of the 
power company will be impaired, the court will deny the 
application. 
Thus, the case had to do only with [**21] the 
impairment of already vested rights of the Power 
Company, a protestant, and the reinstatement of the 
theretofore rejected Application No. a-1171, to assure 
that there be no such impairment by the exchange and 
diversion of Esthma Tanner's previously established right 
under the Morse Decree. Even the trial court, in this case 
on appeal, concluded as much in its Finding No. 10, 
hereinbefore mentioned, to the effect that the instant 
action was the first case where a court has been called 
upon to fix the amount of domestic water useable during 
the winter season. 
Counsel for respondents agreed with the trial court, 
and if both merely had said this action was the first case 
in which a court has attempted to fix the amount of 
domestic useable winter water since the Morse Decree, 
they both would have been accurate and the anachronism 
of the present confused litigation would have been 
resolved. 
A careful examination of the text in Tanner v. 
Humphreys, including the excerpt therefrom reproduced 
in the dissent, clearly indicates that there is no support in 
that case for the pronouncement in the dissent to the 
effect that Provo City's rights "were adjudicated in 
Tanner v. Humphreys" [**22] and that "that ruling 
should be determinative of this case." 
The only question here is the correctness of the State 
Engineer's first decision under Application for Change in 
Point of Diversion No. a-460, February 9, 1966, 
authorizing a diversion of the full 2.52 cubic feet per 
second of water at a new place of delivery, which 
incidently involves the correctness of the judgment of the 
trial court. 
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the lower 
court is reversed. We further hold that insofar as the 
respective claims of the parties hereto are concerned, the 
right to use the water involved in this case, in the amount 
awarded in the Morse Decree, to-wit, 2.52 cubic feet per 
second, during the non-irrigation season as spelled out 
therein, belongs to the defendant, Provo City, by mesne 
conveyance, and that the State Engineer's Change Order 
No. a-460, as amended, having to do with the distribution 
of 1.26 cubic feet of water to Provo City, is of no force 
and effect, but that the original Order of the State 
Engineer under No. a-460 is valid; that this case is 
remanded with instructions to vacate the judgment 
heretofore entered by the trial court and to enter 
judgment in accordance with [**23] the pronouncements 
herein made. 
[*1226] Because of the nature, novelty, public 
concern, number of interests involved and the good faith 
pursuant to this litigation by all parties and counsel, no 
costs are awarded, each party to bear its own. 
I CONCUR: Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice. 
CONCURBY: 
CROCKETT; HOWE 
CONCUR: 
CROCKETT, Retired Justice: (Concurring with 
Comments) 
I concur with the main opinion; and I add some 
comments about matters which impress me as supporting 
its conclusion. 
There are certain basic propositions to be kept in 
mind. The first is that the resolution of the dispute over 
the 2.52 cfs of water is to be found in the language of the 
Morse Decree. The second is that the water right dealt 
with in the Decree can be divided into two 
classifications; i.e., water used for culinary, domestic, 
and other purposes; and water used for irrigation. It is to 
be noted that paragraph No. 28 relied upon by the 
defendant is in effect a specific and unrestricted grant 
among the many individual grants in the Decree, while 
paragraph No. 124 relied upon by the plaintiff, is a 
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generality intended to deal primarily with irrigation 
water. 
If paragraph 28 is scrutinized carefully, it [**24] is 
seen as an adjudication (in effect a grant) of an unlimited 
year-around right to 2.52 cfs of water from the Provo 
River to defendants' predecessor John D. Dixon. This is 
so because that paragraph plainly and simply adjudicates 
the right to that amount of water. It contains no 
characterization of the water thus granted as irrigation 
water, neither does it place any limitation upon its use. 
The pertinent part of that paragraph is underscored: 
JOHN D. DIXON. From January 1st to December 
31st. 
As successor in interest to J. H. Snyder, Joshua J. 
Mecham, John W. Hoover, and Hyrum Heiselt to 2.80 
second feet of water which was appropriated upon lands 
in Provo Canyon, the place of use and the point of 
diversion having been changed and the said water is now 
being used upon lands below the mouth of Provo 
Canyon, and the point of diversion from Provo River is 
now at and near the mouth of Provo Canyon, Utah 
County, Utah, and said use may be continued and the 
quantity to which the said defendant is entitled at his said 
point of diversion, at and near the mouth of Provo 
Canyon, is 2.52 second feet;.... 
The part of the Morse Decree relied upon by 
plaintiff, and which [**25] has been urged as casting 
doubt as to the effect of paragraph 28 as has been stated 
above, is found 96 paragraphs further on, in paragraph 
124. The pertinent parts are underscored: 
That all rights declared and decreed herein, for 
domestic and municipal uses and for the generation of 
power, are continuous throughout the year without 
limitation to time or season. 
And that all the rights declared and decreed herein, 
for irrigation purposes, include the right to divert and use 
water for irrigation, culinary, domestic and agricultural 
purposes connected therewith. And such rights of 
diversion and use for culinary, and domestic purposes are 
continuous throughout the year, and are limited to the 
quantity reasonably necessary for said uses. And such 
rights of diversion and use for irrigation purposes is 
confined to the irrigation season of each year, and none 
of said parties shall divert or use any of said waters, 
(except for culinary and domestic purposes as 
hereinbefore provided), during the non-irrigating season-
-after the necessity for such use for irrigation purposes 
has ceased in the Autumn of each year and until it is 
necessary to use the same for irrigation [**26] purposes 
in the Spring of the year following. 
It will be noted that the substance of the first 
paragraph of paragraph 124 just quoted is that all water 
rights for uses other than irrigation are continuous 
throughout the year; and that the remaining portion 
[*1227] thereof is dealing with water used for irrigation 
purposes. Though it is true that the second sentence of 
the latter paragraph states that waters used for culinary 
and domestic purposes are limited to the quantity 
reasonably necessary for those uses, the fair and 
reasonable import of the entire paragraph is that the 
restriction it states in confining the use of irrigation water 
to the irrigation season is intended to affect only 
irrigation water; and there is no basis therein for 
concluding that it was intended to restrict the right to use 
the water granted in paragraph 28, neither to reduce the 
amount, 2.52 cfs, permitted to be used, nor as to the time 
of year. Consequently, because the right decreed in 
paragraph 28 is neither restricted nor designated as being 
"for irrigation purposes" the limitations upon irrigation 
water as stated in paragraph 124 should not deprive 
defendants (predecessors) of the right to [**27] use up 
to the 2.52 cfs granted in paragraph 28. 
What has been said above would seem to be 
sufficient to settle the controversy. But, if it is thought 
necessary to further fortify the soundness of the Court's 
decision, there are two rules of construction which also 
tend to do so. The first is that if there is inconsistency, 
uncertainty or overlapping in the provisions of a 
document, language which deals more specifically with a 
subject matter takes precedence over general language. 
Thus, the express grant of water in paragraph 28, without 
limitation thereon, should take precedence over the 
general statement and the limitation on irrigation water 
stated in paragraph 124. 
Even more important here is the rule that if there is 
inconsistency or doubt about the language used in a 
document, the practical construction placed on it, as 
shown by the actions of the parties, should be given 
consideration, and may be regarded as persuasive. The 
right awarded to John D. Dixon appears to have been 
honored on a year-round basis from the time of the 
Morse Decree in 1921 for a period of 46 years, until 
March 8, 1967, when the plaintiff first protested the 
defendant's right to the use of the water. [**28] 
When what has been said above is considered 
together with the sound propositions set forth in the main 
opinion: that once the ownership of water is shown (in 
defendant here) the burden is upon the attacker (plaintiff 
here), it seems sufficiently persuasive to me that the 
ownership and use of the 2.52 cfs feet of water as has 
been owned and used by Provo City for these many years 
should remain undisturbed. 
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HOWE, Justice: (Concurring in the Result) 
I concur in the result. 
As Justice Crockett points out in his opinion, it is not 
clear that § 28 of the Morse Decree made the Dixon 
right an irrigation right. It is not so designated and there 
is no language in § 28 to indicate that the 2.52 c.f.s. of 
water was to be used for irrigating lands. It is interesting 
to compare the wording of § 28 with the preceding § 27 
where in many instances the water decreed is specified to 
be used for the irrigation of a certain number of acres of 
land. No such reference appears in § 28. It is neither 
specified that it is for irrigation purposes nor are the 
lands upon which the water is to be applied identified. 
This Court in Tanner v. Humphreys, 87 Utah 164, 
48 P.2d 484 (1935) treated the [**29] Dixon right as an 
irrigation right as had the State Engineer and the district 
court, but whether it was or was not such a right was not 
an issue in that case. However, if we concede that the 
Dixon right was an irrigation right and that § 124 must 
be read in connection with § 28, then it becomes 
necessary to analyze § 124. Respondents base their 
argument on the contents of the fourth paragraph which 
contains five sentences. Those sentences may be 
summarized as follows: 
1. The right to divert and use water for irrigation 
purposes is confined to the irrigation season and no one 
shall divert or use water after the irrigation season, 
except for culinary and domestic use. 
2. Included in an irrigation right is the right to divert 
and use water for irrigation, culinary, domestic and 
agriculture purposes connected therewith. 
3. Such right of diversion and use for culinary and 
domestic purposes are continuous throughout the year, 
but limited as to [*1228] the quantity reasonably 
necessary for such uses. 
4. The River Commissioner shall enforce the 
provisions of this paragraph, particularly with respect to 
the quantity of water diverted during non-irrigation 
season whenever such [**30] diversion will interfere 
with the use of water by parties who have been awarded 
water for the generation of power. 
5. If the Commissioner imposes rules and regulations 
which aggrieve any user, he, his heirs, executors, 
administrators, successors and assigns may apply to the 
court and the court will review the Commissioner's 
actions and give an order of direction. 
There is nothing in § 124 which directs, 
contemplates or even suggests, that any user would ever 
have to return to court to prove the quantity of culinary 
or domestic water he was entitled to use. Nor is there 
any hint in the language of § 124 that a user would 
always be limited to that quantity of culinary water he 
was using on the date the Morse Decree was entered. We 
did not fix that date or any other date as a base date in 
Tanner v. Humphreys, supra. Since one of the objections 
to the change application requested in that case was that 
the use would be enlarged, this Court stated that it might 
be "necessary for the [trial] court to take evidence on the 
question of what amount of water would be reasonably 
required during the non-irrigable season for culinary and 
domestic purposes, and so condition the decree [**31] 
as to permit only that amount to be taken from the 
tributaries during such non-irrigation season." The 
implication in that language is that the base for measuring 
any increase in use would be the current year, not the 
May 1921 use. Thus I conclude that while the user is 
limited to such quantity as is reasonable for his needs on 
his premises, that amount could well differ from month-
to-month and year-to-year as people moved on and off 
the premises, and as the number of head of livestock kept 
there changed. The amount could not, of course, exceed 
2.52 c.f.s. which was granted. 
The language of § 124 contemplates that a user 
return to court only if the commissioner imposed some 
restriction on his use, with which the owner disagreed 
and he desired the court to review it. Nothing in § 124, 
or in any other part of the decree, directed or 
contemplated that the hundreds of users on the river 
would have to return to court some day to prove their 
actual use of culinary water in May 1921. I refer to § 
134 of the decree which provided that the court would 
retain jurisdiction for the following purposes: (a) to make 
corrections for clerical errors, but only for 60 days; (b) to 
determine and [**32J fix the quantity of losses by 
evaporation and seepage; (c) to determine and fix 
payments and assessments to be borne by the parties; (d) 
to appoint commissioners and fix their compensation. 
Then it was stated, "In all other respects the decree shall 
be final." 
Thus I conclude that the main purpose of § 124 was 
to prevent the wasting of water and to ensure that there 
was always enough flow in the river to satisfy power 
generation needs. 
It follows from what I have said that the trial court's 
determination that the burden rested with Provo City and 
Hamblin to prove their May 1921 culinary use was 
erroneous. Their culinary use at that time does not 
forever fix their right. In view of that fact, it was also 
erroneous because, as pointed out in the main opinion, 
nowhere in the water jurisprudence of this state does the 
owner of a water right bear the burden of being able at all 
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times to prove that he is using all the water which has 
been decreed to him. The burden has always been on the 
person who claims that an owner of a water right was not 
beneficially using all his water to establish that fact. 
There is nothing in our opinion in Tanner v. Humphreys, 
supra, which dictates [**33] otherwise. It did not hold 
that the user would have to return to court and bear the 
burden of proving his May 1921 culinary use. It simply 
held that when an application is filed to permit a change 
in the point of diversion and nature of use, the applicant 
must make a prima facie showing that the required 
change will not impair vested rights of others. But the 
opinion recognized that this involved proving a negative 
and stated, "It would be impractical to require the 
plaintiff to ferret out all of the ways in which the others 
[*1229] might perchance be injured, and offer proof in 
negation thereof as a part of its affirmative case. The 
general negative as against injury to the protestants is 
sufficient to carry the case over a motion for a nonsuit in 
that respect." 
Crockett, Retired Justice, concurs in the opinion of 
Justice Howe. 
DISSENTBY: 
STEWART 
DISSENT: 
STEWART, Justice: (Dissenting) 
I would affirm the decision of the trial court. 
Provo City's predecessor in interest, Esthma Tanner, 
had the right to 2.52 cfs of water during the irrigation 
season (May to October) and the right to use the amount 
of water necessary for domestic and culinary purposes 
during the rest of the year. [**34] Contrary to the 
majority opinion, the rights of Provo City were 
adjudicated in Tanner v. Humphreys, 87 Utah 164, 48 
P.2d 484 (1935); that ruling should be determinative in 
this case. This Court in Tanner construed the Morse 
Decree and expressly held that Esthma Tanner, who had 
succeeded to the so-called Dixon right under the Morse 
Decree, had the right to 2.52 cfs of water during the 
irrigation season only. The Court's holding today that 
Tanner owned that right for the entire year is not 
reconcilable with the adjudication in Tanner. 
The Court further held in Tanner that Esthma Tanner 
had the burden under the decree of proving the amount 
that was "reasonably required for domestic and culinary 
purposes" during the nonirrigation season. In Tanner, the 
Court stated: 
We believe that the [trial] court and the respondent 
[Esthma Tanner] are both correct in their interpretation 
of the decree that by paragraph 124 of the said decree the 
plaintiff was only entitled to water up to 2.52 second feet 
for irrigation purposes and in the nonirrigation season 
only so much thereof as was reasonably required for 
domestic and culinary purposes on the premises where 
[**35] the irrigation water was used. But this matter 
could also have been taken care of in the decree. It might 
have been necessary for the court to take evidence on the 
question of what amount of water would be reasonably 
required during the nonirrigable season for culinary and 
domestic purposes, and so condition the decree as to 
permit only that amount to be taken from the tributaries 
during such nonirrigation season. We think that all that 
the plaintiff asked and all that she could get was an 
exchange of the waters which she had under her right, but 
that as far as the complaint and evidence were concerned 
up to the point of the motion for a nonsuit, she was 
entitled to a decree giving her that right, the court to 
supplement with a hearing on the amount reasonably 
necessary for domestic purposes. Thus interpreted, it 
disposes of the contention that the plaintiff was in effect 
seeking to appropriate additional water. [ 48 P.2d at 
488.] 
Insofar as the record discloses, neither Esthma 
Tanner nor her successors, including Provo City, has ever 
established the amount of water to which Tanner was 
entitled during the nonirrigation season. 
Maughan, Justice, did not participate herein; [**36] 
Henriod, Retired Justice, sat. 
Crockett, Retired Justice, acted on this case prior to 
his retirement. 
